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INTRODUCTION
Across the United States, roughly 740,000 people are held in local
jails, two-thirds of whom have not been convicted of a crime.1 Those
two-thirds represent what is known as pretrial detention,2 a common
practice and direct result of monetary bail used by the United States
Criminal Justice system.3 Pretrial detention and crime rates share an in-
verse relationship: though crime rates are at historic lows, pretrial deten-
tion has expanded.4 Between 1970 and 2015, the number of people held
in pretrial detention increased from 82,922 to 441,790, a 433% increase.5
The purposes of pretrial detention are to ensure both public safety
and court appearances by the accused individual.6  But in practice, pre-
trial detention especially for misdemeanor crimes is often a result of a
person’s financial inability to pay their bail, without regard for either of
its intended purposes.7 This means that pretrial detention disproportion-
ately affects already marginalized communities—poor people, women,
and people of color.8 The disproportionate effect of pretrial detention on
poor people raises Equal Protection claims, begging the question of
whether pretrial detention violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
1 Leon Digard, Justice Denied: The Harmful and Lasting Effects of Pretrial Detention, VERA
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, at 1 (April 2019), https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/Justice-De-
nied-Evidence-Brief.pdf.
2 “Pretrial detention refers to detaining of an accused person in a criminal case before the trial
has taken place, either because of a failure to post bail or due to denial of release under a pre-trial
detention statute.” Pretrial Detention, U.S. LEGAL, https://definitions.uslegal.com/p/pre-trial-deten-
tion (last visited Mar. 3, 2020).
3 Digard, supra note 1, at 2.
4 Id. at 10.
5 Id. at 1.
6 P.R. Lockhart, Thousands of Americans are jailed before trial. A new report shows the
lasting impact., VOX (May 7, 2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/5/7/18527237/pretrial-detention-
jail-bail-reform-vera-institute-report.
7 This Comment, when not referring to a specific person, will use the inclusive “their” plural
possessive pronoun, instead of singular gendered pronouns, such as “his” or “her.”
8 Digard, supra note 1, at 2.
2
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Fourteenth Amendment because it infringes on the pretrial liberty of the
indigent, but never infringes on the liberty of their similarly-situated
wealthy counterparts.
Criminal justice reform advocates argue that practical solutions ex-
ist.9 Widely-suggested alternatives to pretrial detention include meaning-
ful bail hearings, court date reminders, the use of unsecured bonds, and
pretrial supervision.10 Other proposed reforms include modest solutions,
such as simply not arresting mentally-ill persons, replacing arrests with
citations for certain crimes, accelerating the pace of court processes, and
placing calls to released people to remind them of their court dates.11
Though crime rates have steadily declined, pretrial detention is still
being expanded—but only for those who cannot pay.12 The detriment of
the trend toward expanding pretrial detention is that it erodes equal pro-
tection for indigents by categorically refusing to grant them the same
protections afforded to their similarly-situated wealthy counterparts. Pre-
trial detention is also incredibly costly compared with alternative mea-
sures: the average daily cost of pretrial detention is $74.61, while pretrial
supervision averages $7.17.13 This economic burden is compounded by
the fact that pretrial incarceration often breeds recidivism, creating a cy-
cle of crime.14
The Supreme Court has long held that detention based on indigency
is unconstitutional because it denies indigents equal protection under the
law while reserving legal protection for the indigent’s wealthy counter-
part.15 In reviewing these claims, the Supreme Court has employed
heightened scrutiny.16
9 Id. at 8.
10 Id.
11 How to Fix Pretrial Justice, PRETRIAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE (2018), https://www.pretrial.org/
get-involved/learn-more/how-to-fix-pretrial-justice/#replace-money-bail.
12 Digard, supra note 1, at 1.
13 How to Fix Pretrial Justice, supra note 11, at 3.
14 See ODonnell v. Goodhart 900 F.3d 220, 232 (5th Cir. 2018) (Graves, Jr., J., dissenting)
(citing ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 251 F.Supp.3d 1052, 1121 (S.D. Tex. 2017)) (“[S]tudies of bail
systems in the United States have concluded that even brief pretrial detention because of inability to
pay a financial condition of release increases the likelihood that misdemeanor defendants will com-
mit future crimes . . . one study found that for misdemeanor defendants, even two to three days of
pretrial detention correlated at statistically significant levels with recidivism”).
15 See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971);
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
16 See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971);
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983); see generally Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
Under intermediate scrutiny, statutory classifications are constitutional if they serve important gov-
ernmental objectives and are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. “Height-
ened scrutiny” and “intermediate scrutiny” are often used interchangeably; this Comment will so use
them.
3
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In 2018, the Fifth Circuit in ODonnell v. Harris County followed
Supreme Court precedent and employed heightened scrutiny to a claim
concerning detention based on indigency.17 The ODonnell court held that
the challenged government scheme violated the indigent defendant’s
equal protection rights and, as such, did not survive heightened scru-
tiny.18 At the time of the ODonnell opinion, the Fifth Circuit was the
only circuit that had decided this issue. That is, until the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s opinion in Walker v. City of Calhoun.19 The Eleventh Circuit’s
decision in Walker created a split in the circuit courts by deciding an
analogous case the other way.20 In upholding the City of Calhoun’s bail
policy, the Eleventh Circuit employed rational basis review21 instead of
heightened strict scrutiny.22 The Eleventh Circuit held that this was the
right standard of review because the petitioner did not suffer an “absolute
deprivation” of pretrial release and therefore was not entitled to any form
of heightened scrutiny.23  In April 2019, the Supreme Court denied plain-
tiff Maurice Walker’s petition for writ of certiorari without a statement
as to the reason for denial, and solidified the Federal circuit split on the
issue.24
This Comment argues that wealth-based discrimination claims con-
cerning pretrial detention of indigents should be analyzed under an Equal
Protection framework and subjected to intermediate scrutiny. In order to
provide an overview of the Supreme Court precedent established for
these types of claims, Part I of this Comment will discuss the relevant
and historic Supreme Court cases which have analyzed wealth-based in-
carceration claims in the United States. To further establish how Federal
Courts have treated wealth-based incarceration Equal Protection claims,
Part II will discuss the Fifth Circuit’s relevant opinions. Part III outlines
the court’s decision in Walker, discussing how the Eleventh Circuit panel
arrived at its holding and consequently created a split among the federal
circuit courts that is yet to be resolved.
This Comment further argues that the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in
Walker is erroneous. Part IV will outline why the Eleventh Circuit
should have applied intermediate scrutiny to Walker’s wealth-based dis-
17 ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147, 162 (5th Cir. 2018).
18 Id.
19 Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2018).
20 Compare Walker, 901 F.3d 1245, with ODonnell, 892 F.3d 147.
21 Under rational basis review, a law is constitutional if it is rationally related to a legitimate
government interest. See generally City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985).
22 Walker, 901 F.3d at 1261-62.
23 Id.
24 Walker v. City of Calhoun, Georgia, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 1, 2019), https://
www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/walker-v-city-of-calhoun-georgia/.
4
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crimination claim, and highlights the fallacious logic the court employed
in reaching its holding. Additionally, this section will also argue that
Walker sets a harmful precedent for indigent defendants. Wealth-based
discrimination claims concerning an indigent’s pretrial liberty are cate-
gorically different from other wealth-based discrimination claims which
don’t concern a liberty right. As such, these claims should be analyzed
with a heightened level of scrutiny beyond mere rational basis review.
I. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HAS ESTABLISHED THAT
INDIVIDUALS HAVE A RIGHT AGAINST WEALTH-BASED
INCARCERATION
More than fifty years ago, the United States Supreme Court estab-
lished that individuals have a right to be free from wealth-based discrimi-
nation in the context of incarceration.25 Under the Williams-Tate-
Bearden Rule, individuals cannot be subjected to imprisonment solely
because of their indigency.
In Williams v. Illinois, the case from which the rule derives, the Su-
preme Court held that, under the Equal Protection Clause, a state may not
subject a certain class of convicted defendants to a period of imprison-
ment beyond the statutory maximum solely because of their indigency.26
Williams was given the maximum sentence for petty theft under Illinois
law: one year’s imprisonment and a $500 fine, plus $5 in court costs.27
The judgment, as permitted by statute, provided that if, when the one-
year sentence expired and he did not pay the monetary obligations, he
would remain in jail to work them off at the rate of $5 a day.28 The Court
concluded that when the aggregate imprisonment exceeded the maximum
cost fixed by statute, and results directly from involuntary nonpayment
of a fine or court costs, impermissible discrimination rests on the inabil-
ity to pay.29 Because petitioner was imprisoned beyond the one year
maximum due solely to his inability to pay the fines and court costs, the
court violated his right to Equal Protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment.30
One year after Williams, in Tate v. Short, the Supreme Court held
that it is a denial of equal protection to limit punishment to payment of a
fine for those who are able to pay it, but to convert that same fine to
25 Williams, 399 U.S. at 240-241.
26 Id. at 239-245.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 236.
29 Id. at 240-241.
30 Id. at 241.
5
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imprisonment for those who are unable to pay it.31 Tate, an indigent, was
convicted of traffic offenses and fined a total of $425.32 Texas law pro-
vided only fines for such offenses, but it required that persons unable to
pay must be incarcerated for sufficient time to satisfy their fines, at the
rate of $5 per day.33 In Tate’s case, this meant an 85-day term.34 Despite
minor factual differences between the two cases, the Court extended Wil-
liams, stating that, “[a]lthough the instant case involves offenses punish-
able by fines only, petitioner’s imprisonment for nonpayment constitutes
precisely the same unconstitutional discrimination since, like Williams,
petitioner was subjected to imprisonment solely because of his indi-
gency.”35 The court held that Tate’s continued imprisonment based on
his inability to pay fines was a denial of equal protection of the law.36
Next, in Bearden v. Georgia, the Supreme Court held that the trial
court erred in automatically revoking Bearden’s probation and sentenc-
ing him to prison for his inability to pay fines, without determining
whether the petitioner had made bona fide efforts to pay and whether
alternative forms of punishment existed.37 The Court relied on Williams
and Tate in its analysis.38
Petitioner Bearden had a ninth-grade education and an inability to
read.39 As a result, he could not pay fines for his felony burglary and
theft convictions because he could not find a job.40 The Court found that
if the petitioner could not pay despite sufficient efforts to do so, the trial
court should have considered measures other than imprisonment.41 The
Court held that Bearden could only be imprisoned if alternative measures
were not adequate to meet the state’s interests in punishment and deter-
rence.42 The majority explained that due process and Equal Protection
principles converge in an analysis of wealth-based incarceration claims,
but the part of the claim that asks whether the state has denied a group of
31 Tate, 401 U.S. 395.
32 Id. at 397.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 397-98.
36 Id. at 399.
37 Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668-69.
38 Id. at 674.
39 Id. at 662.
40 Id. at 663.
41 Id. at 672.
42 Id.; see generally Deterrence, 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 1.5(a)(4) (3d ed.) (“punishment and
deterrence” being longstanding central tenets of criminal law in the United States). At the core,
deterrence is a theory of punishment. As the criminal code explains, “the sufferings of the criminal
for the crime he has committed are supposed to deter others from committing future crimes, lest they
suffer the same unfortunate fate.”
6
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individuals a substantial benefit available to another group is to be re-
viewed under the Equal Protection Clause.43
II. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT HAS REVIEWED WEALTH-BASED
INCARCERATION CLAIMS UNDER AN EQUAL PROTECTION
ANALYSIS AND APPLIED INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
A. PUGH V. RAINWATER
In Pugh v. Rainwater, the Fifth Circuit held that the government can
impose wealth-based incarceration upon a showing that the practice is
necessary to assure a defendant’s presence at trial.44 The Fifth Circuit
noted that it accepts “the principle that imprisonment solely because of
indigent status,” that is, without regard for the defendant’s appearance at
trial, “is invidious discrimination and not constitutionally permissible.”45
Though the court did not find the challenged government scheme uncon-
stitutional, the court noted that in the case of the indigent they have “no
doubt. . .that pretrial confinement for inability to post money bail would
constitute imposition of an excessive restraint.”46
Notably, the Rainwater court did not explicitly state what level of
scrutiny they found appropriate in analyzing the constitutionality of the
government scheme in question.47 Rather, in describing the appropriate
analysis, the court implied heightened scrutiny is appropriate.48 The
court stated that absent meaningful consideration of other possible alter-
natives to paying bail, incarceration of indigent defendants infringes on
equal protection requirements.49
B. ODONNELL V. HARRIS COUNTY
More than thirty years later, the Fifth Circuit again reviewed an
Equal Protection claim brought by an accused indigent under intermedi-
43 Id. at 665.
44 Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1058 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).




49 Id.; see also Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151 (1980) (holding that
the consideration of “alternative” measures is highly relevant and often dispositive to intermediate
scrutiny); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281 (1979). Contra Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 103 n.20
(1979) (holding that under rational basis review, it is “irrelevant to the equal protection analysis . . .
that other alternatives might achieve approximately the same result”); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312,
330 (1993) (holding that under rational basis review, courts “‘must disregard’ the existence of alter-
native methods of furthering the objective”).
7
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ate scrutiny.50 In ODonnell v. Harris County, the Fifth Circuit applied
heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause to a bail policy
that effected wealth-based incarceration of misdemeanor arrestees.51
Discussing the appropriate level of scrutiny, the ODonnell court ac-
knowledged that, ordinarily, prisoners and indigents do not constitute a
suspect class, and therefore would not ordinarily receive a heightened
scrutiny analysis.52 However, the court noted that the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Williams and Tate provided that heightened scrutiny is re-
quired when a criminal defendant is detained because of their
indigence.53
Further, the court relied on the Supreme Court’s instruction in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.54 There, the Court
noted that “indigents receive a heightened scrutiny where two conditions
are met: (1) because of their impecunity they were completely unable to
pay for some desired benefit, and (2) as a consequence, they sustained an
absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit.”55
The facts of ODonnell’s case met the exception for heightened scru-
tiny because the two conditions laid out in Rodriguez were both satis-
fied.56 In Harris County, indigent arrestees were unable to pay for the
desired benefit of secured bail.57 As a consequence, they sustained an
absolute deprivation of that benefit.”58 The court found that the bail pol-
icy subjected indigent arrestees to an absolute deprivation of their most
basic liberty—freedom from incarceration.59 The court elaborated,
“[m]oreover, this case presents the same basic injustice: poor arrestees in
Harris County are incarcerated, where similarly-situated wealthy ar-
restees are not, solely because the indigent cannot afford to pay a secured
bond.”60 The Fifth Circuit Court concluded that Harris County’s bail pol-
icy violated the Equal Protection Clause.61 Thus, the policy was uncon-
50 ODonnell, 892 F.3d 147.
51 Id. at 163.
52 Id. at 16; see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)
(describing that a class is considered suspect “when the class is [sic] saddled with disabilities, or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of politi-
cal powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.”
53 Id. at 163 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20 (1973))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
54 Id. at 161.




59 Id. at 163.
60 Id. at 162.
61 Id. at 163.
8
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stitutional because it detained defendants solely based on their inability
to pay bail, resulting in their detention pretrial.62
III. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT IN WALKER V. CITY OF CALHOUN SPLIT
FROM THE FIFTH CIRCUIT PRECEDENT THAT WEALTH-BASED
INCARCERATION CLAIMS ARE SUBJECT TO
INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
A. FACTS
On September 3, 2015, Maurice Walker was arrested in the City of
Calhoun, Georgia for being a pedestrian under the influence of alcohol.63
In Georgia, this type of violation carries no possible jail sentence.64  De-
spite the statutory punishment of a fine not to exceed $500, Walker was
jailed and told by a police officer that he would not be released unless he
paid the $160 cash bond.65  This bond amount was calculated by Cal-
houn’s bail schedule at the time, which allowed pretrial release for ar-
restees who could pay the fine they would be ordered to pay if found
guilty, plus applicable fees.66 However, neither Walker nor his family
had enough money to post the bond.67 Walker was a fifty-four-year-old
unemployed man with a mental health disability.68 His income was lim-
ited to $530 a month from Social Security disability payments.69 While
in jail, Walker was not given his necessary medication and was confined
to a single-person cell for all but one hour each day.70
Five days after his arrest, while still in jail, Walker filed a suit alleg-
ing that the City of Calhoun was violating the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment by “jailing the poor because they cannot pay
a small amount of money.”71 The day after Walker filed the suit, he was
released on a personal-recognizance bond72 in agreement with the City’s
62 Id.
63 Walker, 901 F.3d at 1251.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 1252.




71 Id. at 1251-52.
72 In a personal recognizance bond, an accused person is released without paying a monetary
bond. Rather, the accused person must sign a written promise to appear at their scheduled court
appearance. Personal recognizance bonds are also subject to other obligations a judge can impose,
such as requiring the accused person to refrain from certain activities or to meet with a probation
officer. If the accused fails to adhere to these requirements, then they can be arrested. Release on
9
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counsel.73 In response to Walker’s suit, the Municipal Court of the City
of Calhoun altered its bail policy by issuing a Standing Bail Order.74
The main difference between this new bail policy and the previous
was the limit on the amount of time an indigent could be detained pre-
trial.75 While the previous bail policy subjected Walker to five days in
jail, the new policy would subject him and other indigents alike to a
maximum of forty-eight hours.76 “‘For those individuals who do not ob-
tain release pursuant to the secured bail schedule,’ the Standing Bail Or-
der provides that they ‘shall. . .be brought before the [Municipal] Court’
within 48 hours from their arrest. . . .”77 The municipal court would then
determine whether accused individuals are unable to post secured bail
because they are indigent.78 If the court finds that the accused is indigent,
the accused would be subject to release on recognizance without making
a secured bail payment.79  If no hearing was held within forty-eight
hours, the accused would be released on a recognizance bond.80
The district court found the city’s new bail policy to be unconstitu-
tional and issued a preliminary injunction.81 Specifically, the district
court found that the Standing Bail Order violated the Constitution be-
cause it permitted individuals with financial resources to post a bond
affording them immediate release, while individuals who do not have
those resources must wait forty-eight hours for a hearing.82 To replace
the city’s policy, the district court prescribed an affidavit-based process
for making a determination of indigency for pretrial arrestees.83 The pro-
cess provided that if an arrestee indicates an inability to pay bail, then
“arresting officers, jail personnel, or Municipal Court staff must, as soon
as practicable after booking verify the arrestee’s inability to pay. . . by
means of an affidavit sworn before an authorized official.”84 Addition-
Own Recognizance, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/criminal/bail-bonds/release-on-own-recogni-
zance/ (last updated May 2019).








81 Id. at 1253 (quoting Walker v. City of Calhoun (Walker III), No. 4:15-CV-0170-HLM,
2017 WL 2794064, at *2-3 (N.D. Ga. June 16, 2017)).
82 Id. (quoting Walker III, No. 4:15-CV-0170-HLM, 2017 WL 2794064, at *2-3 (N.D. Ga.
June 16, 2017)).
83 Id. (quoting Walker III, No. 4:15-CV-0170-HLM, 2017 WL 2794064, at *4 (N.D. Ga. June
16, 2017)).
84 Id. (quoting Walker III, No. 4:15-CV-0170-HLM, 2017 WL 2794064, at *4 (N.D. Ga. June
16, 2017)).
10
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ally, an official must evaluate the affidavit within twenty-four hours after
arrest.85 Those determined to be indigent would be subject to release on
recognizance without having to make secured bail.86 The City of Cal-
houn appealed this injunction order with the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals.87
B. MAJORITY OPINION
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals established that Walker’s
claim fit into the Williams-Tate-Bearden and Rainwater line of cases.88
However, they disagreed with the district court that heightened scrutiny
applied and that a traditional Equal Protection analysis was required.89
Additionally, it disagreed with the district court’s contention that wealth-
based incarceration is an exception to the application of rational basis
review within wealth-based classifications.90 The majority read the
Bearden line of cases to say that claims concerning pretrial bail release
should be evaluated under a traditional due process rubric.91 The major-
ity reasoned that a due process analysis made sense in Walker’s case
because the relief he sought was “essentially procedural: a prompt pro-
cess by which to prove his indigency and to gain release.”92 The funda-
mental requirement in a due process analysis of wealth-based-
discrimination cases criminal in nature is “the opportunity to be heard at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”93 A due process analy-
sis is flexible and considers the governmental and private interests that
are affected.94 The Eleventh Circuit Court concluded that the district
court should have applied this type of analysis in deciding whether the
City of Calhoun’s bail policy violated due process guarantees.95
85 Id. (quoting Walker III, No. 4:15-CV-0170-HLM, 2017 WL 2794064, at *5 (N.D. Ga. June
16, 2017)).
86 Id. (quoting Walker III, No. 4:15-CV-0170-HLM, 2017 WL 2794064, at *5 (N.D. Ga. June
16, 2017)).
87 Id. at 1254.





93 Id. (quoting Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).
94 Id. (quoting Matthews, 424 U.S. at 334); see also U.S. v. Juvenile Male 670 F.3d 999,
1013 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that a procedural due process claim involves two steps: “[T]he first
asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State;
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The disagreement as to the appropriate standard of review was
rooted in part by the Eleventh Circuit and the district court’s reading of
Rainwater, respectively.96 There, the Eleventh Circuit majority stated
that the Rainwater court “approved the utilization of a master bond
schedule without applying any form of heightened scrutiny.”97 The ma-
jority further acknowledged that Rainwater explained that a bond sched-
ule provided for speedy and convenient pretrial release for those who
could pay.98 The court inferred from this that, “if the bond schedule pro-
vided ‘speedy’ release to those who could meet its requirements, it nec-
essarily provided less speedy release to those who could not.”99 The
resulting logic was that Rainwater approved the use of a bond schedule
that treated arrestees differently based on their ability to pay. The court
further noted that the Fifth Circuit in Rainwater upheld a bail schedule
because it provided a bail hearing for indigent defendants who could not
pay the bond “at which the judge could consider all the relevant factors
when deciding the conditions of release.”100 This bail hearing was a con-
stitutionally permissible alternative option.101
The Eleventh Circuit majority then looked to San Antonio Indepen-
dent School District v. Rodriguez to explain how wealth-based discrimi-
nation claims have been analyzed under the Equal Protection Clause.102
The panel acknowledged that in Rodriguez, the Supreme Court held that
wealth-based discrimination was impermissible only if it imposes an ab-
solute deprivation of a benefit.103 The majority read Rodriguez to say
that the “[m]ere diminishment of a benefit was insufficient to make out
an [E]qual [P]rotection claim.”104Applying this standard to Walker’s
case, the court held that forty-eight hours of incarceration is not an abso-
lute deprivation of the benefit of pretrial release because indigents must
merely wait some amount of time to receive the same benefit afforded to
the more affluent.105  The court opined that if they held in favor of
Walker, the indigent here would receive preferential treatment by being








102 Id. at 1261.
103 Id. (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)).
104 Id. (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 24) (“the Equal Protection Clause
does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages”).
105 Walker, 901 F.3d at 1261.
106 Id. at 1262.
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The court next considered Walker’s contention that this type of
wealth-based discrimination claim requires a heightened scrutiny analy-
sis.107 The court disagreed, stating that this type of scheme does not trig-
ger intermediate scrutiny under Equal Protection jurisprudence.108 If
Walker was correct in applying heightened scrutiny as courts typically do
in cases of race, sex, or religion, then the courts would be flooded with
litigation.109  As a result, the court predicted “innumerable government
programs” would be in “grave constitutional danger” by this logic:110
If the Postal Service wanted to continue to deny express service
to those unwilling or unable to pay a fee, it would have to justify that
decision under the same standard it would have to meet to justify pro-
viding express service only to white patrons. The University of Geor-
gia would be unable to condition matriculation on ability to pay tuition
unless it could meet the same constitutional standard that would allow
it to deny admission to Catholics. In Walker’s preferred constitutional
world, taxes that are independent of income, such as property taxes or
sales taxes, would be the target of perpetual litigation. All that is to
say, we do not believe that Bearden or Rainwater announced such
radical results with so little fanfare, and we therefore reject Walker’s
equal protection theory. The district court was wrong to apply height-
ened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.111
The court turned to the forty-eight-hour holding time which the
Standing Bail Order required of the accused before their indigency deter-
mination hearing was held.112 The Eleventh Circuit Court needed to de-
termine what constituted the constitutionally required prompt probable
cause hearing for those arrested without a warrant.113 They relied on the
Supreme Court’s decision in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin regard-
ing the meaning of prompt.114  Thus, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that
“indigency determinations for purposes of setting bail are presumptively
constitutional if made within 48 hours of arrest.”115 Accordingly, the
court ruled that the Standing Bail Order was constitutional.116
In a footnote, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the Fifth Circuit’s






112 Id. at 1265.
113 Id. at 1266.
114 Id. (citing County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 55 (1991)).
115 Id. at 1266.
116 Id. at 1269.
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precedent because facts between the two respective cases were dissimi-
lar.117  The court acknowledged that ODonnell applied heightened scru-
tiny under the Equal Protection Clause after concluding that there, the
plaintiff suffered an absolute deprivation of his most basic liberty inter-
ests.118 The court maintained, however, that the Fifth Circuit in ODon-
nell ruled this way because the challenged policy there did not provide
arrestees any opportunity to prove indigency, unlike the City of Cal-
houn’s forty-eight-hour policy.119
C. DISSENTING OPINION
Judge Beverly B. Martin disagreed with the majority’s decision to
not apply heightened scrutiny.120 Her dissent was based on a reading that
the Supreme Court opinions in Williams, Tate, and Bearden and the Fifth
Circuit’s Rainwater supported the district court’s application of height-
ened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause to the city’s Standing
Bail Order.121
The dissent specifically disagreed with the majority’s reliance on
Rodriguez to support a finding that heightened scrutiny did not apply.122
In Judge Martin’s reading of Rodriguez, Walker was entitled to make an
Equal Protection claim warranting heightened scrutiny because his case
satisfied both parts of the test established in Rodriguez: (1) whether the
challenged scheme uses indigency as a classification because it treats
persons totally unable to pay differently, and (2) whether the class has
suffered an “absolute deprivation” of a benefit.123 The dissent asserted
that the majority never addressed part one of the test in Rodriguez: that
is, whether the Standing Bail Order discriminates against indigents.124
Judge Martin contended that the Standing Bail Order clearly used
indigency as a classification because when two people are arrested for
the same crime under identical circumstances, the Standing Bail Order
allows the person with money to pay it and walk away while the indi-
gent, unable to pay, goes to jail.125 She then addressed the majority’s
claim that reviewing wealth-based discrimination with heightened scru-
tiny would extend to various kinds of wealth-based interactions.126 She
117 Id.at 1266 n.12.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 1273 (Martin, J., dissenting).
121 Id. (Martin, J., dissenting).
122 Id. (Martin, J., dissenting).
123 Id. (Martin, J., dissenting).
124 Id. (Martin, J., dissenting).
125 Id. (Martin, J., dissenting).
126 Id. at 1274 (Martin, J., dissenting).
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argued that the majority’s claim would never be realized according to the
Supreme Court’s opinion in M.L.B. v. S.L.J: there, the Court distin-
guished lawsuits seeking to alleviate the consequences of differences in
economic status as different from those which vindicate “a person’s right
to participate in political processes or to have access to the courts in
criminal cases.”127 M.L.B. precludes wealth-based discrimination claims
that do not concern basic fundamental rights which implicate Equal Pro-
tection under the law.
Addressing the second prong of the test laid out in Rodriguez, Judge
Martin called the majority’s characterization that forty-eight hours of de-
tention is a “diminishment” of a benefit, rather than an absolute depriva-
tion of a benefit, simply “word play.”128 Forty-eight hours in jail is not a
diminishment but surely a deprivation of liberty.129 This characteriza-
tion, Judge Martin asserts, aligns with Rodriguez because there the Court
found an “absolute deprivation” of liberty where the challenged state
laws subjected indigents to incarceration simply because of their inability
to pay their fines.130 Further, Rainwater also described pretrial confine-
ment as a “deprivation of liberty.”131
Additionally, “[n]either Rodriguez nor Rainwater qualified how
long the confinement had to last before it became a deprivation of lib-
erty.”132  For further support, the dissent cited the recent Supreme Court
case Rosales-Mireles v. United States.133 In Rosales, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed that “any amount of actual jail time is significant, and ha[s]
exceptionally severe consequences for the incarcerated individual [and]
for society which bears the direct and indirect costs of incarceration.”134
The second prong of the Rodriguez test, Judge Martin maintained, is sat-
isfied in Walker’s favor, because forty-eight hours in jail is an absolute
deprivation of liberty.135
Next addressing the majority’s claim that ODonnell is factually dis-
tinct from Walker, the dissent maintained that the only difference be-
tween the two cases is the length of detainment in each respective policy.
127 Id. (Martin, J., dissenting).
128 Id. (Martin, J., dissenting).
129 Id. (Martin, J., dissenting).
130 Id. (Martin, J., dissenting).
131 Id. (Martin, J., dissenting).
132 Id. at 1275 (Martin, J., dissenting) (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 20-22
and Pugh, 572 F.2d 1053 at 1056).
133 Id. at 1275 (Martin, J., dissenting) (quoting Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
1897, 1907 (2018)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
134 Rosales-Mirales, 138 S. Ct. at 1907 (2018) (quoting Glover v. United States, 531 U.S.
198, 203 (2001) and United States v. Jenkins, 854 F.3d 181, 192 (2d Cir. 2017)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
135 Walker, 901 F.3d at 1274-1275 (Martin, J., dissenting).
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In ODonnell, the challenged system allowed indigents to be detained
longer than the forty-eight hours that the challenged system in Walker
allowed.136 The factual difference here in length of detention between the
two systems is not a meaningful one.137 Being jailed for forty-eight hours
is more than a mere inconvenience, contrary to the majority’s claim, be-
cause it has “very real consequences for detained indigents.”138 Judge
Martin cited the fact that indigents, as a result of detainment, can “lose
their homes and transportation. Their family connections can be dis-
rupted. And all this is to say nothing of the emotional and psychological
toll a prison stay can have on an indigent person and her family mem-
bers.”139 These consequences occur and can be just as dire for a short jail
sentence, such as two days, as for a longer jail sentence.140
Judge Martin rejected the majority’s claim that treating wealth-based
discrimination the same as race, sex, or religion by applying heightened
scrutiny would flood the courts.141  The reason is because the Supreme
Court has “already placed limits on bringing equal protection challenges
to wealth-based classifications.”142 These limits consist of the test set out
in Rodriguez as well as the M.L.B. Court’s statement that fee require-
ments are examined only for rationality except when they implicate basic
rights to participate in political processes and access to judicial processes
in criminal cases.143 Because of these Supreme Court limitations, Mr.
Walker’s claim falls into a narrow exception that does not implicate tui-
tion fees or express postal service.144 The dissent claims that here, the
court simply needed to make explicit what was already made implicit by
the court in Rainwater, “namely that pretrial detention based solely on
indigency is subject to heightened scrutiny.”145
The dissent offers, however, that even if the courts were flooded and
the workload increased, the importance of resolving these types of cases
outweighs the burden. “[T]he constitutional imperatives of the Equal
Protection Clause must have priority over the comfortable convenience
136 Id. at 1275 (Martin, J., dissenting) (citing ODonnell, 892 F.3d 147 at 154).
137 Id. (Martin, J., dissenting).
138 Id. at 1275-1276 (Martin, J., dissenting).
139 Id. at 1276 (Martin, J., dissenting) (citing Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html).
140 Id. (Martin, J., dissenting) (citing Juleyka Lantigua-Williams, Why Poor, Low-Level Of-
fenders Often Plead to Worse Crimes, THE ATLANTIC (July 24, 2016)), https://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2016/07/why-pretrial-jail-can-mean-pleading-to-worse-crimes/491975/.
141 Id. at 1277 (Martin, J., dissenting).
142 Id. (Martin, J., dissenting).
143 Id. (Martin, J., dissenting).
144 Id. (Martin, J., dissenting).
145 Id. at 1278 (Martin, J., dissenting).
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of the status quo.”146 Because Rodriguez required that Walker’s claim be
reviewed under heightened scrutiny in an equal protection framework,
the dissent would affirm the district court decision that the city’s pretrial
detention of indigents for forty-eight hours is a violation of equal
protection.147
IV. ANALYSIS
A. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT SHOULD HAVE APPLIED INTERMEDIATE
SCRUTINY UNDER AN EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS TO
WALKER’S WEALTH-BASED INCARCERATION CLAIM
The Supreme Court has “long been sensitive to the treatment of indi-
gents in our criminal justice system.”148 Both the majority and the dis-
sent in Walker assert that the Bearden line of cases is unclear as to what
standard of analysis should be applied to wealth-based discrimination
claims, yet they reach different results, respectively.149 The majority rea-
sons that the relevant Supreme Court cases do not prescribe heightened
scrutiny for these cases, and instead require a rational basis review.150
Judge Martin reads those same cases to say that some level of
heightened scrutiny applies, though the Bearden line of cases does not
make clear what level of scrutiny applies to wealth-based incarceration
claims: intermediate or strict scrutiny.151 Judge Martin is correct that the
Bearden line of cases suggests a level of scrutiny beyond a rational basis
review, yet the Walker majority chose to employ neither level of scru-
tiny. The application of a rational basis review was an erroneous decision
based largely on a misunderstanding of both Supreme Court precedent as
the Bearden line of cases established, as well as Fifth Circuit precedent
which the court in Rainwater and ODonnell established. Although the
relevant Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit decisions may not have been
explicit in their decision to employ heightened scrutiny, that these cases
discussed “alternatives” in their analysis makes clear that scrutiny was
heightened beyond a rational basis.
Alternatives are a distinguishing factor between rational-basis re-
view and heightened scrutiny because only in the case of the latter are
“alternatives” relevant to a court’s analysis. Under rational-basis review,
which the Eleventh Circuit employed instead of heightened scrutiny,
146 Id. (Martin, J., dissenting) (quoting Williams, 399 U.S. 235 at 245).
147 Id. (Martin, J., dissenting).
148 Bearden, 461 U.S. at 664.
149 See Walker, 901 F.3d at 1273-78 (Martin, J., dissenting).
150 Id. at 1264-65 (Martin, J., dissenting).
151 Id. at 1278 (Martin, J., dissenting).
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courts “must disregard the existence of alternative methods of furthering
the objective.”152 The Supreme Court has articulated that when employ-
ing a rational-basis review, “that other alternatives might achieve approx-
imately the same result” is irrelevant to the Equal Protection analysis.153
By contrast, the Supreme Court has consistently analyzed whether
“alternatives” to the government’s challenged system are available in its
application of heightened scrutiny. In Orr v. Orr the Court found that
Alabama could not use gender as a classification for financial need in
alimony cases when its alimony laws provided an alternative solution
that had already occurred.154 Similarly, in Wengler v. Druggists Mutual
Ins. Co., the Court found that gender-based classification was invalid
because an adequate gender-neutral alternative was available.155 And
more recently in McCullen v. Coakley, the Court concluded that the chal-
lenged law failed heightened scrutiny because the government had a “va-
riety of approaches that appear[ed] capable of serving its interests.”156
Most relevantly, in Williams, Tate, and Bearden, the United States
Supreme Court also looked at alternatives to the challenged government
practice. Because alternative means were relevant to the analysis there, it
follows that heightened scrutiny applies when a government scheme or
law imposes wealth-based incarceration. Since Walker “fits squarely”
within the Bearden line of cases, the majority was wrong to not apply the
same level of scrutiny as the Court in those cases applied.157 That is not
to say that wealth-based discrimination claims are always reviewed with
heightened scrutiny—and the court in Rodriguez held that normally they
are not.158 However, Rodriguez further held that when a class is com-
posed of persons who are “totally unable to pay,” wealth-based discrimi-
nation claims are exempted from rational basis review.159
Even if the Supreme Court had not clearly established that height-
ened scrutiny applies, the high court’s two-pronged test for whether to
heighten scrutiny of wealth-based discrimination claims as laid in Rodri-
guez should have controlled.160 Walker’s claim would have met both
prongs and, consequently, would have fit squarely into a heightened
scrutiny analysis. Ultimately, Walker, not the City, would have pre-
152 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 330 (1993) (quoting Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 235
(1981)).
153 Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 102, n.20 (1979).
154 Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281 (1979).
155 See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151 (1980).
156 McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 493-94 (2014).
157 Walker, 901 F.3d at 1273 (Martin, J., dissenting).
158 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 29.
159 See id. at 22.
160 Id. at 1, 20.
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vailed. His claim would have satisfied the first prong because the City of
Calhoun’s bail policy targets indigent arrestees who, because of their in-
digency, are completely unable to pay for the desired benefit of freedom
from pretrial incarceration. The claim would have also satisfied the sec-
ond prong because as a consequence of being indigent, and therefore
being unable to pay for freedom from pretrial incarceration, indigent ar-
restees sustain an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to
enjoy freedom from pretrial incarceration.
Having satisfied both prongs of the Rodriguez test, the court should
have then proceeded to analyze Walker’s claim under intermediate scru-
tiny.161 The questions then would have been whether the City of Calhoun
had a compelling interest in enforcing the new bail policy, and whether
that policy was narrowly tailored to meet that interest, or whether other
alternatives were better suited to meet the interest. The city’s new bail
policy would not survive intermediate scrutiny because it was not nar-
rowly tailored to meet this interest since it subjected an arrestee to pre-
trial incarceration for as long as forty-eight hours before determining
indigency.162
If the Walker majority had subjected the City of Calhoun’s bail pol-
icy to intermediate scrutiny, the court would have, at a minimum, af-
firmed the district court’s ruling that forty-eight hours of pretrial
detention for indigents was a violation of Equal Protection because alter-
native measures were available.163 Alternative measures relevant here
would have been shorter pretrial detention, such as the twenty-four hours
which the district court injunction ordered, or other pretrial reforms sug-
gested by the relevant body of literature.164
B. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S OPINION SETS HARMFUL PRECEDENT
FOR INDIGENT ARRESTEES
Though the Walker majority entertained application of the Rodri-
guez test, the majority’s analysis of the test was misguided at best. As
Judge Martin points out in her dissent, in its analysis, the court never
addressed whether the City of Calhoun’s Standing Bail Order discrimi-
nated against indigents.165 Instead, its analysis started at part two of the
Rodriguez test, which asks whether the class has suffered an absolute
deprivation of a benefit.166 However, this part of the test was analyzed
161 ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 162.
162 Walker III, WL 2794064 n.2 (N.D. Ga. June 16, 2017).
163 Cf. Walker, 901 F.3d at 1263.
164 See Digard, supra note 1, at 2; see also How to Fix Pretrial Justice, supra note 11, at 3.
165 Walker, 901 F.3d at 1273 (Martin, J., dissenting).
166 Id. at 1274 (Martin, J., dissenting).
19
Hernandez: An Absolute Deprivation of Liberty
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2021
122 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
incorrectly. In its analysis of the second prong of the Rodriguez test, the
majority does not refer to the benefit in Walker’s case as liberty or even
freedom from pretrial incarceration but rather labels the benefit as “pre-
trial release.”167 That is, the Walker majority relied erroneously—when
considering whether there was an “absolute” deprivation of a benefit—
on the amount of time that indigent arrestees are detained pretrial. And
reliance on forty-eight-hour pretrial detention led it to the conclusion that
“pretrial release,” the benefit here, is only diminished for the indigent
arrestee but not something of which they are absolutely deprived.168
Judge Martin was correct, though generous in the claim that the major-
ity’s faulty analysis here was “word play.”169
No other federal or circuit court had discussed a diminished benefit
in this context prior to Walker, and relevant case law does not proscribe
the length of time of pretrial detention for indigents as a relevant consid-
eration under this analysis. As Judge Martin points out in her pragmatic
dissenting opinion, neither Rodriguez nor Rainwater qualified how long
the confinement had to last before it became a deprivation of liberty.170
The Walker majority simply inferred the concept of a diminished benefit
(and its distinction from an absolute deprivation) from the Rodriguez
court’s assertion that “at least where wealth is involved, the Equal Pro-
tection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal ad-
vantages.”171 Further, it reasoned “[t]he duty of the State. . .is not to
duplicate the legal arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal
defendant. . .but only to assure the indigent defendant an adequate oppor-
tunity to present his claims fairly.”172 To the Eleventh Circuit, the Equal
Protection Clause is satisfied with diminished benefits for some, and full
benefits for others.
To arrive at the holding that forty-eight-hours is constitutional con-
finement for indigent arrestees in a pretrial setting, the Walker majority
relied on McLaughlin, a factually distinct case.173 McLaughlin should
not have controlled  because that case concerned the length of wait-time
for probable cause hearings, and challenges to pretrial confinement by
accused indigent persons are inherently and categorically different from
other claims.174 Additionally, as the dissent points out, McLaughlin as-
serted that hearings which are delayed for the sake of delay are unconsti-
167  Id. at 1261.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 1274 (Martin, J., dissenting).
170 Id. at 1275 (Martin, J., dissenting).
171 Id. at 1261 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 24).
172 Id. (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974)).
173 Id. at 1266; City of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).
174 City of Riverside, 500 U.S. at 54; Bearden, 461 U.S. 660 at 64-65.
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tutional, and here, the city of Calhoun did not state a reason as to why
indigent arrestees had to wait forty-eight hours before a determination of
indigency.175 The court’s decision in Mclaughlin should have guided the
Walker majority toward a ruling for Walker, not the City of Calhoun.
The Walker majority also relied on the ODonnell opinion for a con-
stitutional time of pretrial confinement, as the ODonnell court ultimately
concluded that a forty-eight-hour maximum confinement time was ap-
propriate.176 This reliance is seemingly more appropriate, given the simi-
lar pretrial incarceration discrimination claims at issue in each case
(though elsewhere in the opinion the Walker court also alleged that the
facts here were distinguishable from ODonnell).177 But this reliance was
misplaced because in ODonnell, Harris County alleged that a maximum
of 24-hour confinement for indigent arrestees was an administrative bur-
den for them.178 Here, however, the City of Calhoun offered no reason
for the chosen forty-eight-hour maximum, resulting in an arbitrary wait-
time, or a delay for the sake of delay.179 Nevertheless, an arbitrary wait-
ing time was sufficient for the Eleventh Circuit.
The Eleventh Circuit was wrong to uphold this arbitrary time and to
not require any justification by the City of Calhoun. This result is ulti-
mately problematic because it sets a new precedent that forty-eight hours
is a magic number of sorts, the constitutional length of time that an indi-
gent arrestee can be detained pretrial. Further, the Walker court’s charac-
terization of forty-eight hours of pretrial detention for indigents as only a
“diminishment” of a benefit rather than a deprivation is also problematic.
Even the court in ODonnell felt forty-eight hours was in some ways not a
deprivation.180 That a benefit, such as the liberty at stake here, changes
from a diminishment to a deprivation after forty-eight hours is highly
questionable. But at least in ODonnell, it is apparent that any time before
the forty-eight-hour maximum pretrial incarceration, an indigent’s pre-
trial liberty interests are outweighed by the administrative burdens of the
Harris County court system.181 But what Walker presents is more vexing
because the liberty interests of indigents are not outweighed by any other
stated, competing interests.182 Forty-eight-hour pretrial detention because
of indigency, Walker implies, is simply a fact of life; yet another luxury
175 Walker, 901 F.3d at 1279 (Martin, J., dissenting).
176 Id. at 1266 (citing ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 160-61).
177 Id. at 1269 n.12.
178 See ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 159.
179 Walker, 901 F.3d at 1279 (Martin, J., dissenting).
180 ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 160.
181 Id. at 159.
182 See Walker, 901 F.3d at 1279 (Martin, J., dissenting).
21
Hernandez: An Absolute Deprivation of Liberty
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2021
124 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
service indigent people simply cannot afford, such as with express mail
service and university tuition.
One need not wonder why a federal court such as this one would
employ a shallow analysis of an Equal Protection claim to pretrial con-
finement based on indigency—an analysis that has dire consequences for
underprivileged communities.183 The answer lies in the court’s engage-
ment of hypotheticals. Such as the court’s suggestion that holding in
favor of Walker would result in “preferential treatment” to the indi-
gent.184 The glaring irony in this logic is that pretrial detention, as it
stands in the United States, already affords preferential treatment to the
affluent. In this country, those who can afford to post bail are never sub-
jected to pretrial detention simply because of their wealth. The court’s
conflating of rights with luxuries also serves as a window into the court’s
faulty logic. The court’s suggestion that applying heightened scrutiny to
Walker’s claim would result in innumerable government programs being
in “grave constitutional danger” blatantly ignores, perhaps even feigns
ignorance of, Supreme Court case law as well as Fifth Circuit precedent
that characterized pretrial confinement based on indigency as categori-
cally different from other claims.185
The Eleventh Circuit’s radical predictions for what would ensue if
they ruled in favor of Walker requires an equating of university tuition
and express mail service with freedom from pretrial incarceration. Con-
flating the right to freedom with luxuries may reveal an elitist
worldview: for the wealthy and affluent, freedom from incarceration, ex-
press mail service, and university tuition may appear the same because
the barriers to affording them simply do not exist. This reading may be
further bolstered by the fact that a majority of federal judges cannot iden-
tify with people too poor to pay bail: many of them come from elite
schools and affluent upbringings, are not from diverse backgrounds, and
certainly not from underrepresented communities.186
The Eleventh Circuit’s hypothesizing about ruling in favor of
Walker is dictum, but it should not be any less concerning for two rea-
183 See How to Fix Pretrial Justice, supra note 10, at 3.
184 Walker, 901 F.3d at 1261-62.
185 Compare Walker, 901 F.3d at 1262 with Bearden, 461 U.S. at 665 (1983) (explaining that
wealth-based incarceration is distinct from other wealth-based classifications because it involves
both Equal Protection claims as well as due process claims) and San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411
U.S. at 20 (holding that when a class is composed of persons who are “totally unable to pay,”
wealth-based discrimination claims are exempted from rational basis review). See also Walker, 901
F.3d at 1274 (Martin, J., dissenting).
186 See Danielle Root et al., Building a More Inclusive Federal Judiciary, CENTER FOR
AMERICAN PROGRESS (Oct. 3, 2019, 8:15 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/courts/re-
ports/2019/10/03/475359/building-inclusive-federal-judiciary/.
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sons. One, since dictum by definition means an opinion or belief,187 we
can read this harmful conflation as the opinion or beliefs of federal
judges about an indigent’s disposition in the criminal justice system, if
not their disposition in the world at large. Federal judges are quite liter-
ally public servants, who swear an oath to serve justice equally to the
poor and to the rich.188 The belief that access to pretrial incarceration and
express mail service are categorically similar is egregious. The former
implicates freedom, while the latter concerns a trivial luxury especially
by comparison. That this belief is held by a majority of federal judges in
a particular circuit, by those who decide the fate of thousands of indigent
defendants in multiple states, is incredibly disturbing.
Two, even if we can cast aside the harmful conflation as mere non-
controlling opinion, concerns about Equal Protection should still remain
because lawyers and judges alike often conflate dicta with holdings.189
This risk of conflation here compounds the dangerous precedent that
Walker creates for indigent arrestees. Other lawyers or courts may con-
fuse Walker’s dicta with its holding, erroneously citing it to argue that
Equal Protection analysis is unwarranted for indigent defendants claim-
ing discrimination under a city’s bail policy because this discrimination
is no different from innumerable other government programs that dis-
criminate based on wealth. In this unsavory scenario, indigent arrestees
would suffer harm nationally.190
CONCLUSION
Supreme Court precedent, as well Fifth Circuit holdings, have estab-
lished that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate level of scrutiny for
claims brought by indigent defendants challenging a government policy
that prescribes pretrial incarceration for them but never their similarly-
187 Dictum is defined as “a statement of opinion or belief considered authoritative because of
the dignity of the person making it.” Dictum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
188 William M. Richman, Comment, Elitism Expediency and the New Certiorari: Requiem for
the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL. L. REV. 273, 277 (1996).
189 Judith M. Stinson, Comment, Why Dicta Becomes Holding and Why it Matters, 76 BROOK.
L. REV. 219, 221 (2010).
190 See ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1158 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (“Pretrial detention of misde-
meanor defendants, for even a few days, increases the chance of conviction and of nonappearance or
new criminal activity during release,” and. . . “[c]umulative disadvantages mount for already impov-
erished misdemeanor defendants who cannot show up to work, maintain their housing arrangements,
or help their families because they are detained”). See also id. at 1121 (noting that “[r]ecent studies
of bail systems in the United States have concluded that even brief pretrial detention because of
inability to pay a financial condition of release increases the likelihood that misdemeanor defendants
will commit future crimes or fail to appear at future court hearings,” and that one study “found that
for misdemeanor defendants, even two to three days of pretrial detention correlated at statistically
significant levels with recidivism”).
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situated wealthy counterparts. Even if a court fails to read the relevant
case law to proscribe intermediate scrutiny for pretrial incarceration
claims brought by indigents, the two-prong test laid out in Rodriguez can
help such a claim fall into intermediate scrutiny. To address these
wealth-based discrimination claims with a higher standard than rational
basis review would be a step toward true Equal Protection for all in the
context of pretrial incarceration.
However, the issue still remains as to the specific declaration in
Walker that forty-eight hours is a constitutionally permissible length of
time indigents must wait to receive freedom from incarceration. Why
should indigents be discriminated against in a pretrial setting when crea-
tive alternative solutions to pretrial incarceration exist, and the harms of
pretrial confinement on indigent communities of color are well-
documented?
The Eleventh Circuit implicitly answers this question with the ra-
tionalization that the Equal Protection Clause does not require “absolute
equality” between indigent arrestees and their wealthy counterparts.191
As long as this type of rationale forms federal circuit precedent of
wealth-based discrimination claims brought by indigents, then poor peo-
ple, women, and people of color will continue to be adversely and dis-
proportionately affected by pretrial incarceration in this country.192
The denial of pretrial liberty to indigent arrestees sooner than forty-
eight hours “is a misfit in a country dedicated to affording equal justice
to all and special privileges to none in the administration of its criminal
law.”193 An absolute deprivation of liberty in the context of indigents’
ability to pay versus their similarly-situated wealthy counterparts is any
length of time, but surely all lengths beyond twenty-four hours. Alterna-
tive solutions to pretrial confinement should be required of the counties
that detain indigents pretrial for an inability to pay, alternatives which do
not concern any amount of jail time, or at a minimum no longer than
twenty-four hours. It need not be a radical claim that indigents are enti-
tled to the protections that the law affords their similarly-situated wealthy
counterparts, nor that the pretrial liberty interests of indigents should in-
herently outweigh the administrative burdens on courts. As Judge Martin
correctly declared, “[t]he constitutional imperatives of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause must have priority over the comfortable convenience of the
status quo.”194
191 Walker, 901 F.3d at 1261 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 24.
192 Lockhart, supra note 6, at 2.
193 ODonnell, 900 F.3d at 228–29 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956)).
194 Walker, 901 F.3d at 1278 (Martin, J., dissenting) (quoting Williams, 399 U.S. at 245).
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